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Sales Compensation and Recommendations 
as the Fund of the Month† 
By YOONHAE OH* 
This study analyzes whether mutual fund distributors are more likely to 
recommend products with higher sales compensation to maximize their 
profit. The lists of the ‘fund of the month’ on their webpages are utilized 
from April of 2015 to August of 2015. A simple comparative analysis 
shows that the average sales fees and the average front-end load are 
significantly higher in the recommended funds among the A share class 
of domestic equity funds. The results of a regression analysis confirm 
that funds with high sales compensation levels are more likely to be 
recommended. This holds true for both domestic equity funds and 
hybrid bond funds even after controlling for fund age, fund size, and 
past returns.  
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  I. Introduction 
 
ince the global financial crisis, the importance of financial consumer protection 
has been strengthened. The UK and Australia have especially focused on conflicts 
of interest in recommendation services caused by the compensation scheme employed. 
From 2013, they banned commissions for financial advisors who recommend retail 
investment products to consumers. However, in Korea, sales personnel who 
recommend retail investment products in financial institutions may still prioritize 
products with higher commissions than the best products for the consumers. 
Recently, the financial authorities in South Korea introduced the IFA (independent 
financial advisor) to ease conflicts of interest in existing sales channels. However, 
Korean consumers do not recognize possible conflicts of interest, which can easily 
stem from the sales compensation scheme, and the demand for IFAs is very low in 
the market.1 Therefore, to activate the demand for IFAs, it is necessary to make 
consumers aware of the possibility of the conflicts of interest in the product
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recommendation of fund distributors.  
This study analyzes the relationship between product recommendations by mutual 
fund companies and their corresponding sales compensation amounts. Specifically, 
the recommendation lists posted on the webpage as the fund of the month are 
analyzed. This approach serves to confirm whether financial institutions attempt to 
sell products with higher remuneration. 
Mutual fund investors must pay various expenses to the sales personnel for the 
services of investment soliciting, product recommendations and the conclusion of a 
contract. Among mutual funds, fee structures and sizes vary.2 Hence, mutual fund 
distributors have an incentive to recommend a fund product with a greater sales fee 
or commission to maximize their profit. Therefore, this study focuses on conflicts of 
interest which can arise due to this type of sales compensation. Therefore, this study 
analyzes the effects of seller incentives on recommending what is termed the fund 
of the month. The roles of brokerage firms or asset management companies are not 
the main concern of this study.3  
Some studies analyzed domestic equity funds before 2010 to examine conflicts of 
interest. Shin and Cho (2014) show that the mutual funds with the higher sales fees 
show higher fund inflows. Won (2009), Cho and Shin (2012) and Ban (2015) show 
a negative or insignificant relationship between ongoing sales fees and rates of return.  
These studies confirm that policies are needed to ease conflicts of interest in the 
fund market. Accordingly, the compensation system of funds has changed 
significantly since 2010 in Korea. The structure of fees has diversified into various 
share class funds. The sales fee amounts have also fallen. However, these changes 
have made it difficult to analyze the effects of sales compensation on inflows in the 
market recently. Information about fund inflow and outflow amounts are not divided 
into share class levels. Thus, though an analysis remains necessary, related studies 
are limited.  
In this context, the present study utilizes lists of the ‘fund of the month’ posted on 
financial institutions’ web pages from April of 2015 to August of 2015. In particular, 
the sales compensation amounts, in this case ongoing sales fees and one-time front-
end load fees, are compared between the funds on the lists versus those which are 
not recommended. A regression analysis is also conducted, and these results show 
that funds with high sales compensation amounts are more likely to be recommended 
even after controlling for other characteristics of the mutual funds.4  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces related studies, and 
Section III covers the background of the fund market in Korea and the research 
question. Section IV presents the comparative analysis, and Section V presents the 
regression results. Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
1Consumers may consider a recommendation service by banks or security companies to be free, and they do 
not want to pay separate fees for IFAs. 
2 The forms of these fees also vary, from one-time front/back-end load commissions to ongoing annual 
maintenance fees. 
3Although the regression results in the appendix include variable for management fees and brokerage fees, they 
are not discussed further, as they are additional control variables. 
4For this analysis, it is necessary to assume that fund-selling institutions recommend funds from an online 
recommendation list to offline customers. Because financial institutions declare that their recommendation fund 
council selected the online list according to quantitative and qualitative criteria, an offline recommendation list 
would share the evaluation criteria. Therefore, it is considered reasonable to analyze online recommendation lists to 
evaluate conflicts of interest in the mutual fund market. 
VOL. 41 NO. 2   Sales Compensation and Recommendations as the Fund of the Month 61 
II. Literature Review 
  
The issue of conflict of interest in the retail investment products is related to the 
problem of principal-agent when the incentive scheme is inconsistent (Arrow, 1963; 
Hormstrom, 1982). This study focuses on conflicts of interest that arise during the 
product recommendation process. This problem is caused by the fact that sales 
personnel receive compensation from the product manufacturer indirectly instead of 
receiving an advisory fee from the consumers directly.  
The literature indicates that recommendation services in financial markets are 
distorted due to indirect commissions. According to Mullainathan et al. (2012), 
financial advisors tend to recommend a portfolio with transaction and management 
costs higher than those of index funds. Anagol et al. (2017) find that in India, life 
insurance sellers recommend products with higher commissions for themselves 
despite the fact that other products are better for consumers.  
Previous studies analyze conflicts of interest in the financial market, reporting 
higher sales amounts for products with higher commissions. Siri and Tufano (1998) 
and Christoffersen et al. (2013) report a positive relationship between the inflow of 
U.S. mutual funds and commission sizes.  
The Korean literature also focuses on the equity mutual fund market. Before 2010, 
share class C funds, which receive high ongoing sales fees, dominated the Korean 
mutual fund market. However, they were cited as having excessive sales fees, and 
the sellers did not provide maintenance services in exchange for the ongoing sales 
fees. In this context, Shin and Cho (2014) report a positive relationship between sales 
fees and fund inflows, suggesting a conflict of interest. Shin and Cho (2014) analyze 
C-Class domestic equity fund from 2007 to 2010, finding a significant positive 
relationship in a sample of funds with no affiliated asset management company. In 
contrast, among funds with affiliated asset management companies, the relationship 
is negative or insignificant.  
Other strands of studies analyze the relationship between sales compensation and 
fund performance in the domestic equity fund market. Won (2009) pointed out that 
funds with higher sales fees show lower rates of return, and the amounts of the sales 
fees are high for funds sold by banks. Cho and Shin (2012) also report a negative 
relationship between sales fee amounts and fund performance. Ban (2015) analyzes 
equity funds between 2001 and 2009, reporting no significant relationship between 
risk-adjusted returns and sales fee amounts.  
Despite the fact that earlier studies showed evidence of a conflict of interest in the 
mutual fund market in Korea, there is a lack of more recent research on conflicts of 
interest in the mutual fund market. After 2010, the scheme of sales compensation 
became more diversified. There are now sales fees which decrease over time (C1, 
C2) and those for funds sold online (E class). Although various share class funds 
have been introduced as mutual funds, information about outflow and inflow 
amounts is not distinguished at the share class level.5  
For this reason, this study examines disclosed recommendations by fund-selling 
 
5The Financial Investment Association does not provide separate information about inflows and outflows at the 
class level. 
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institutions on their webpages in 2015. Unlike previous studies which utilize fund 
inflows or net flows as a dependent variable, this study utilizes a dummy variable 
indicating a recommendation as a fund of the month as the dependent variable. This 
approach serves to circumvent the problem of information on new inflows for each 
class fund being unavailable since September of 2010. This approach also has the 
advantage of directly confirming recommendations by fund sellers. 
 
III. Background and Hypothesis 
  
A. Mutual Fund Market in Korea 
 
This section explains the market structure of the mutual fund market. In South 
Korea, the net assets of mutual funds increased significantly between 2007 and 2008 
and then declined until 2012. Since 2012, net assets in the mutual fund market began 
to rise again, but the net assets of equity funds decreased steadily until 2015.  
As shown in Table 1, mutual funds can be classified into equity funds, hybrid bond 
funds, and fixed income funds for the purposes of this study. Usually, the levels of 
sales fees are similar within the same fund type, and differences in sales fee are 
considerable across different types of funds.  
Table 2 shows the average sales fee according to the type of fund. The sales fee 
tends to increase when the fund invests in riskier assets. The derivative bond fund 
shows the highest average sales fee, at 0.823 percent, while the hybrid bond fund 
 
TABLE 1—TYPES OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
Type Characteristics  
Equity fund A mutual fund invests in stocks with more than 60% of assets under management (AUM). 
Fixed-income fund A mutual fund invests in bonds with more than 60% of AUM. It does not invest in stocks. 
Hybrid fund A mutual fund invests in both stocks and bonds in various proportions.  If the portion of stocks is less than 50% of the AUM, it is a hybrid bond fund.  
Source: Korea Financial Investment Association (http://dis.kofia.or.kr, last accessed: 2015. 12. 7). 
 
TABLE 2—SALES-RELATED COSTS ACCORDING TO VARIOUS FUND TYPES 
(Unit: %) 
Fund type Front-end Load Sales fee Management fee 
Bond-derivatives fund 0.227 0.823 0.577 
Equity fund 0.162 0.779 0.699 
Hybrid Equity fund 0.164 0.690 0.563 
Hybrid Bond fund 0.077 0.521 0.358 
Fixed-income fund 0.037 0.281 0.197 
Note: Management fees are fees that are paid out of the fund’s assets to the fund’s investment adviser for investment 
portfolio management. 
Source: Korea Financial Investment Association (http://dis.kofia.or.kr, last accessed: 2015. 12. 7). 
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shows the lowest average sales fee of 0.281 percent. Accordingly, there is an 
incentive for fund sales personnel to promote riskier products to earn higher sales 
fees. 
Certain studies, including that by Shin and Cho (2014), focus on equity mutual 
funds to examine the relationship between fund inflows and sales fee. This approach 
is used because it is difficult to compare various types of funds based on identical 
criteria. This paper also compares the sales compensation amounts within each 
mutual fund type, in this case domestic equity funds and hybrid bond funds. 
 
B. Characteristics of Funds of the Month 
 
1. Selection Criteria 
 
Most financial institutions which sell mutual funds provide a recommendation list 
on their websites. This list, with a name in the form of “OO Bank (OO) recommended 
funds,” is selected by the internal recommended products council. They regularly 
select promising products through both quantitative and qualitative measures. 
Quantitative measures include past returns, fund age, AUM, and fund balance levels, 
among other measures, and qualitative evaluations are based on such factors as the 
operation strategies, post-administrative services, and the provision of information. 
The weights of the qualitative measures in the selection criteria vary depending on 
the institution. For example, Woori Bank announced that they assign a weight of 90 
percent to quantitative measures and 10 percent to qualitative measures, while HMC 
Securities Corp. assigns a weight of 40 percent to qualitative measures. 
 
2. Updating Period 
 
Although financial institutions explicitly mention that the updating period of a 
recommendation list and the timing of updates are irregular, the lists generally 
change every month.6 Some products remain on the list even after an update. During 
the survey period of four months, the retention rates of previously selected funds 
remaining in the list were 85.4% and 85.9% among banks and security corporations, 
respectively. On the list of the financial institutions with affiliated asset management 
companies, 23% funds were products of affiliated firms among the banks and the 
16% funds were from affiliated firms among the security corporations.  
The recommended funds for each institution differ considerably. For example, 
when funds recommended by more than two institutions are defined as duplicated 
funds, the ratio of duplicated funds is only approximately 5.3% among banks.  
 
3. Fund Classes and Types 
 
The recommendation lists of fund-selling institutions include both online and 
offline funds. In particular, recommendation lists in the banking industry tend to 
include more products sold online, and the ratio of the CE class was highest, referring 
to funds sold online with no front-end commission. On the other hand, securities 
 
6Ten out of twenty-six institutions have clearly stated that they update their recommendation lists every month. 
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companies recommended more funds sold offline, and the ratio of A-Class funds, 
which incur a front-end commission and which also have small ongoing fees, was 
highest.  
While all institutions recommended equity funds, the securities industry’s lists 
include more equity funds and derivative funds. On the other hand, the lists 
recommended by banks have a higher portion of hybrid bond funds and bond funds.  
 
C. Research Question and Econometric Model 
 
This study examines whether fund-selling companies tend to recommend products 
with higher sales fees or front-end load commissions to customers, testing the 
hypothesis below.  
 
Hypothesis. Fund-selling institutions tend to recommend funds with high sales 
compensation levels.  
 
This study uses lists of what are referred to as funds of the month, which are 
recommended on the websites of fund-selling companies to identify recommendations 
by fund distributors. First, a simple comparative analysis is conducted to compare 
the sales fee amounts or front-end loads between recommended funds and non-
recommended funds. This comparative analysis is performed separately for each 
share class and type. A-Class (one-time front-end load type) and C-Class (ongoing 
fee type) funds sold offline are analyzed, as they are the most common types of 
Korean mutual fund share classes. This study also undertakes a regression analysis 
to examine whether financial institutions tend to select funds with higher sales 
compensation rates as the ‘fund of the month,’ even after controlling for other 
characteristics such as past returns and the size of the fund. 
 
(1) , , ,i t AF i AS i CS i i t i tRecommend Front Afee Cfee Xα β β β γ ε= + + + + +  
The econometric model is shown in equation (1), and an unbalanced random-
effect panel logistic regression analysis is utilized. 7  The dependent variable, 
,i tRecommend , has a value of one when fund i  is recommended during the month 
of t  by any fund sales institution. When the fund is not recommended at all, it has 
a value of zero.  
Independent variables are sales personnel’s compensation amounts, in this case 
sales fees and front-end load commissions, represented by iFront . As ongoing sales 
fees are higher in the C-Class fund than in the A-Class fund, iAfee  and iCfee  are 
separately included, indicating sales fees of A-Class and C-Class, respectively.8 The 
analyses are separately conducted for domestic equity funds and hybrid bond funds, 
 
7The random effect model is used because the main regressor, sales compensation, is fixed while other control 
variables such as past returns and fund sizes change. 
8Front-end loads and sales fees may vary over time. Changes in the sales costs are disclosed on the website of 
KOFIA. However, these changes do not arise frequently, and there were no changes in the sample during this study. 
For this reason, the econometric model includes non-time-varying sales compensation.  
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as past returns differ from one another. I add four control variables in the regression. 
These are the natural log of AUM (assets under management) to represent the size 
of a fund,9 fund age (natural log of the fund age calculated in units of years), past 
market-adjusted net returns,10 and the volatility of the previous rates of return. Time 
fixed effects are also included. 
 
D. Data Collection Method 
 
The lists of funds of the month were collected for five months from April 15 to 
August 18, 2015. The lists were collected manually from the webpages of 26 fund 
sales companies (nine banks and 17 securities companies) each week. A fund is 
classified as a recommended fund if it appeared on the list during the survey period.  
The others are categorized as non-recommended funds. To rule out small-scale 
funds with no cash flow from the sample, funds with an AUM of less than one billion 
won in both March and April of 2015 were excluded. In addition, if a fund is less 
than one year old or if the past rate of returns is not available for a new fund, those 
funds are excluded. For domestic equity funds, index funds are excluded. 
Information on fund sales fees and front-end loads was collected from the Korea 
Financial Investment Association’s homepage as of August 18, 2015. Past balances 
and fund ages were calculated using materials provided by Zeroin. Information on 
the monthly rate of return for calculating past performance was also provided by 
Zeroin. 
Past performance as market-adjustment earnings is calculated based on early May 
of 2015 by subtracting the KOSPI rate from the previous rate of returns. 
Furthermore, abnormal rates of return over the past 18 months were also calculated 
using the three-element model of Fama and French (1992; 1993).11  
 
E. Calculating Past Performances of Funds 
 
In this study, we use 12-month market-adjusted returns in the regression analysis 
to indicate a funds’ past performance. Market-adjusted returns are net returns for 
which market indices are subtracted from the return of a fund. The market indices of 
domestic equity funds and hybrid bond funds are the KOSPI index and the KIS 
Index, respectively.  
Meanwhile, 18-month abnormal returns are also utilized in the comparative 
analysis. Abnormal returns are calculated using market and scale factor information 
obtained from FnGuide’s DataGuide 5 and the KIS index.  
Market-adjusted return can be easily calculated by market indices, but the 
performance of market indices cannot reflect normal expected returns. Thus, bias 
can arise when estimating excessive returns.12 On the other hand, abnormal returns 
 
9This is calculated according to each class at the point of the previous month. 
10This is calculated as the previous 12-month market-adjusted return at the point of the previous month. 
11We also calculated 12-month abnormal returns, and these results were similar to those for 18-month abnormal 
returns. 
12According to Brown and Warner (1980), the market-adjusted return rate implicitly regards all securities beta 
values as a type of market index, assuming that the expected return rate of the securities is identical to the expected 
return rate of the market index. 
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can be measured by eliminating the influence of market factors, scale factors, value 
factors, period factors, and credit factors, but this method is not intuitive compared 
to market-adjusted returns.  
 
IV. Comparative Analysis 
  
In this section, the sales fee amounts and front-end loads are compared, as are the 
fund sizes and previous performance outcomes between recommended funds and 
non-recommended funds. I focus on A-Class and C-Class funds sold offline, which 
are domestic equity funds and hybrid bond funds. The significance test for the mean 
difference is in this case a one-sided T-test. For fund types with few observations, 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is also used, comparing the median values. The results 
of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are shown in the Appendix, and the results are similar 
to those of the T-tests.  
 
A. Amounts of Sales Compensation 
 
Overall, the average sales compensation is higher for recommended funds than for 
non-recommended funds. Table 3 compares the funds on the recommended lists with 
all non-recommended funds in share class A. Among the domestic equity funds, the 
average ongoing sales fee is significantly higher for the recommended funds by 
0.065 percentage points. The average front-end load is also higher in the 
recommended funds by 0.092 percentage points. Among the hybrid bond funds, the 
sales fee and front-end load amounts are both higher for the recommended funds, 
but the differences are not insignificant. 
Table 4 shows that the average sales fees for recommended funds are significantly 
higher for the hybrid bond funds, also showing that the average sales fee is higher 
for hybrid bond funds by 0.163 percentage points. The average sales fee is higher for 
recommended funds among domestic equity funds, but the difference is not 
significant.  
  
TABLE 3—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AVG. SALES FEE AND AVG. FRONT-END LOAD (A CLASS) 
(Unit: %) 
Fund type 
Mean Sales fee Mean Front-end load 
Recommended Non- Recommended Gap Recommended 
Non- 
Recommended Gap 
Domestic equity 0.777 0.712 0.065** 0.956 0.864 0.092* 
Hybrid bond 0.529 0.472 0.057 0.586 0.477 0.109 
Note: 1) The numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) funds are (32, 154) for domestic 
equity funds and (7, 18) for hybrid bond funds. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively. 3) Index funds are excluded from domestic equity funds. 
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TABLE 4—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AVG. SALES FEE (C CLASS) 
(Unit: %) 
Fund types Mean Sales fee Recommended Non-recommended Gap 
Domestic equity fund 1.078 0.995 0.083 
Hybrid bond fund 0.884 0.721 0.163** 
Note: 1) The numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) funds are (9, 77) for domestic equity 
funds and (7, 58) for hybrid bond funds. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 3) Index funds are excluded from domestic equity funds. 
 
B. Assets Under Management and Past Performance 
 
In the previous section, it was confirmed that funds recommended on the fund-
selling companies’ webpages have higher sales fees or front-end loads than other 
funds. Next, we compare other characteristics to determine whether the recommended 
funds have other benefits to offset the high sales-related fees. In this section, we 
compare past AUM and past performance.  
 
1. Assets Under Management (AUM) 
 
Table 5 shows that the average AUM value is much higher for recommended funds 
than for non-recommended funds. Among domestic equity A-Class funds, the 
average past AUM levels amount to 183 billion won for recommended funds and 
24.1 billion won for non-recommended funds. The difference in the average AUM 
remains very large regardless of the class type or type classification. Hence, it is 
confirmed that the size of the fund is an important criterion in the selection of the 
fund of the month for financial institutions.  
In general, large-sized funds can set diverse operational strategies and reduce 
some costs. Therefore, it is considered reasonable for fund sellers to recommend 
large-scale funds. However, the large scale of recommended funds judged to be high 
in sales-related costs may stem from the fact that financial institutions have long 
recommended these funds. However, it is difficult to determine the cause of the size 
difference with currently available data.  
 
TABLE 5—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: AVG. AUM (ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT) 
(Unit: 1 billion Won) 
Fund Type Share Class Recommended Non-recommended median mean s.d. median mean s.d. 
Domestic equity fund 
A 123.5 183.06 204.09 7.08 24.16 48.36 
C 159.66 358.69 458.78 8.45 15.81 25.34 
Hybrid bond fund 
A 47.66 85.41 84.27 1.99 10.42 29.78 
C 140.05 183.19 134.54 7.54 52.33 190.8 
Note: 1) The value for AUM is calculated at the beginning of May of 2015. Funds which started after May of 2014 
are excluded. 2) The numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) funds among domestic equity 
funds are (32, 154), (10, 78) for A-Class and C-Class funds, respectively. The numbers of observations of 
(recommended, non-recommended) funds among hybrid bond funds are (7, 18) and (7, 60) for A-Class and C-
Class funds, respectively. 
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2. Past Performance 
 
As the form of remuneration varies according to the share class, even within the 
same type of fund, past net returns are compared at the share class level after the 
subtracting sales compensation amounts. According to the comparative analysis, 
recommended funds tend to have higher returns, but the differences in the past net 
returns become insignificant at the share class level. 
In Table 6, the average past 12-month market-adjusted return and 18-month 
abnormal return for recommended funds are significantly higher before the sales cost 
deduction. However, when comparing net returns at the share class level, as shown 
in Table 7, the average past net return for recommended funds is only significantly 
higher with the 12-month market-adjusted return for hybrid bond funds. 
 
TABLE 6—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PAST FUND PERFORMANCE (MANAGED FUND LEVEL) 
Fund type 
12-month market-adjusted return 18-month abnormal return  
Recommended Non- recommended Gap Recommended 
Non- 
recommended Gap 
Domestic equity -0.0077 -0.0082 0.0004*** -0.025 -0.025 0.000 
Hybrid bond  0.0853 0.0850 0.0004*** -0.026 -0.030 0.004** 
Note: 1) Past returns are calculated at the point of May 4th, 2015. 2) Abnormal returns are estimated by alpha from 
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). For the market factor, the KOSPI index is used for equity funds 
and the KIS index is used for hybrid bond funds. 3) Market-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the 
KOSPI rate from the previous rate of returns. 4) For 12-month market-adjusted returns, the numbers of observations 
of (recommended, non-recommended) funds are (22, 198) for domestic equity funds and (6, 122) for hybrid bond 
funds. 5) For the 18-month abnormal returns, the numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) 
funds are (17, 170) for domestic equity funds and (3, 108) for hybrid bond funds. 6) ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 7—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PAST FUND PERFORMANCE (SHARE CLASS LEVEL) 
Fund type Share Class 
12-month market-adjusted return 18-month abnormal return  
Recommended Non- recommended Gap Recommended 
Non- 
recommended Gap 
Domestic 
equity 
A -0.0080 -0.0082 0.0002 -0.025 -0.025 0.000 
C -0.0080 -0.0081 0.00005 -0.024 -0.025 0.001 
Hybrid 
bond  
A 0.0854 0.0848 0.0006*** -0.055 -0.046 0.01 
C 0.0852 0.0849 0.0003** -0.050 -0.047 0.003 
Note: 1) Past returns are calculated at the point of May 4th, 2015. 2) Abnormal returns are estimated by alpha from 
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). For the market factor, the KOSPI index is used for equity funds 
and the KIS index is used for hybrid bond funds. 3) Market-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the 
KOSPI rate from the previous rate of returns. 4) For 12-month market-adjusted returns, the numbers of observations 
of (recommended, non-recommended) funds are A (32, 154) and C (9, 78) for domestic equity funds and A (7, 18) 
and C (7, 59) for hybrid bond funds. 5) For 18-month abnormal returns, the numbers of observations of 
(recommended, non-recommended) funds are A (30, 151) and C (8, 70) for domestic equity funds and A (5, 15) 
and C (6, 49) for hybrid bond funds. 6) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively.  
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V. Regression Analysis 
  
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics of the sample for the regression analysis. 
Among all funds during the five months of the sample period, 11.3% and 10.9% of 
funds were recommended from among hybrid bond funds and domestic equity funds, 
respectively. Fund size refers to the natural log of assets under management, and 
Fund age is the natural log of the survival period based on the year. The means of 
Fund size and Fund age are both slightly larger for domestic equity funds. The 
number of A-Class funds, 95, is smaller than the number of C-Class funds, 320, 
among the hybrid bond funds, while the number of A-Class funds is twice as large 
as the number of C-Class funds among domestic equity funds. The average C-Class 
sales fee is slightly larger than the A-Class front-end load in both panels. 
 
TABLE 8—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel I:  Hybrid Bond Funds 
Variable  Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Recommended (dummy) 415 0.113  0.317  0.000  1.000  
Fund size (log) 415 2.334  1.925  -6.705  7.331  
Fund age (log, year) 415 1.522  0.798  -0.083  2.654  
Past 12-month market-adjusted return (%) 415 8.218  0.914  7.146  9.838  
Volatility of 12-month past return (%) 415 11.501  1.358  9.206  12.899  
A-Class front-end loads (%) 95 0.631  0.223  0.2 1 
A-Class sales fees (%) 95 0.497  0.155  0.1 0.9 
C-Class sales fees (%) 320 0.737  0.193  0.4 1.05 
Panel II:  Domestic Equity Funds 
Variable  Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Recommended (dummy) 1,270 0.109  0.311  0.000  1.000  
Fund size (log) 1,270 2.523  1.709  -3.213  7.337  
Fund age (log, year) 1,270 1.770  0.576  -0.042  2.799  
Past 12-month market-adjusted return (%) 1,270 -0.419  0.245  -1.043  0.200  
Volatility of 12-month past return (%) 1,270 2.504  0.238  1.928  3.122  
A-Class front-end loads (%) 845 0.957  0.143  0.5 1.5 
A-Class sales fees (%) 845 0.724  0.187  0.2 1.1 
C-Class sales fees (%) 425 1.000  0.233  0.5 1.5 
 
2. Correlation Tables 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between variables are presented in Table 9. As 
the funds are divided into two classes, A and C, the correlation coefficients are 
calculated for each class of funds. The explanatory variables, the front-end loads or 
the sales fees, have a significant positive correlation, except for C-Class funds 
among domestic equity funds. This implies that higher sales compensation amounts 
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TABLE 9—CORRELATION TABLES 
Panel I:  Hybrid Bond Funds 
A 
 Recommend Size  Age Past Return sd.exReturn A Front Sales fee 
Recommend 1       
Fund size 0.533***  1      
Fund age 0.137  0.219**  1     
Past Return, 0.091  0.056  -0.006 1    
sd.ex return 0.030  -0.024 0.058  0.002  1   
A Front load 0.176*  0.431***  -0.222* 0.016  0.006  1  
A Sales fee 0.246**  0.218**  0.591* -0.002 0.002  -0.209** 1 
C 
 Recommend Size Age Past Return sd_exReturn Sales fee  
Recommend 1       
Fund size 0.384***  1      
Fund age 0.034  0.356***  1     
Past Return, 0.026  0.011  -0.014 1    
sd. ex return 0.020  0.009  0.034  0.001  1   
Sales fee 0.242***  -0.143** 0.187***  -0.001 -0.001 1  
Panel II:  Domestic Equity Funds 
A 
 Recommend Size  Age Past Return sd.exReturn A Front Sales fee 
Recommend 1       
Fund size 0.472*** 1      
Fund age -0.096*** 0.212***  1     
Past Return,, 0.009  0.036  -0.064* 1    
sd. ex return 0.028  0.007  0.027  -0.690*** 1   
A Front load 0.065*  0.079**  -0.064* 0.050  -0.010 1  
A Sales fee 0.113***  0.274***  0.297***  0.013  -0.004 0.111***  1 
C 
 Recommend Size Age Past Return sd.exReturn Sales fee  
Recommend 1       
Fund size 0.516***  1      
Fund age -0.023 0.113**  1     
Past Return, -0.005 0.031  -0.069 1    
sd. ex return -0.010 -0.013 0.045  -0.688*** 1   
Sales fee 0.044  -0.017 0.192***  0.073  0.081*  1  
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
are related to a higher probability of being recommended by the fund-selling company. 
The front-end loads and sales fees for A-Class funds are positively correlated among 
domestic equity funds, whereas they are negatively correlated among hybrid bond 
funds.  
Fund size is significantly correlated with the dependent variable in all cases. Fund 
size and fund age show a significantly positive correlation, reflecting that older funds 
have had enough time to obtain more inflow.  
The VIF index for each variable is less than two, and there is no evidence that 
refutes multicollinearity between the variables. 
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B. Regression Results 
 
1. Hybrid Bond Funds 
 
In this section, the results of the regression analysis are presented. These results 
show that the amounts of sales-related costs have significant effects on the 
probability of a fund being selected as a fund of the month, even after controlling for 
other characteristics of the funds.  
Table 10 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) with the sample of 
hybrid bond funds. Columns (1)-(4) show positive and significant coefficients of the 
sales fees for the A-Class and C-Class funds. This indicates that high ongoing sales 
fees explain the probability of a fund being selected as a fund of the month from 
among other hybrid bond funds. This positive relationship between a 
recommendation and the sales cost is consistent with the findings of Siri and Tufano 
(1998), Christoffersen et al. (2013), and Shin and Cho (2014). 
The coefficient of the front-end load is also positive, but it is only significant in 
column (4), the model without the volatility of past returns and with time fixed 
effects. The results of the additional robustness checks are shown in the Appendix. 
Table A1 shows the results of the robustness check after adding management fees 
  
TABLE 10—REGRESSION: SALES COMPENSATION UPON A RECOMMENDATION FOR HYBRID BOND FUNDS I 
Variables Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 Marginal Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
A-Class front-end loads 
(%)  
5.584 5.620 5.608 8.499* 0.157** 
(4.801) (4.710) (4.834) (4.479) (0.072) 
A-Class sales fees 
(%) 
25.42*** 25.15*** 25.46*** 31.43*** 0.582*** 
(9.512) (9.477) (9.495) (10.09) (0.104) 
C-Class sales fees 
(%) 
17.82** 17.79** 17.84** 24.75*** 0.458*** 
(7.439) (7.360) (7.438) (8.597) (0.103) 
Fund size 
(log) 
2.795*** 2.755*** 2.813*** 2.819*** 0.052*** 
(0.867) (0.843) (0.866) (0.938) (0.008) 
Fund age 
(log, year) 
-1.660 -1.635 -1.650 0.360 0.006 
(1.658) (1.563) (1.669) (1.606) (0.030) 
Past 12-month market-
adjusted return (%) 
0.506  0.509 66.72*** 1.235*** 
(0.399)  (0.408) (20.82) (0.226) 
Volatility of  
past return (%) 
  -0.0420   
  (0.297)   
Constant -32.08*** -27.66*** -31.75*** -523.8***  (9.451) (7.879) (9.555) (161.0)  
Monthly fixed effect x x x o  
No. of observations 415 415 415 415  
Log likelihood -47.148 -48.08 -47.132 -38.986  
Note: 1) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one billion won in March and 
April of 2015 were excluded. 2) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated using the KIS index, and it 
is share class level net return after subtracting sales compensation amounts. 3) ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, and the numbers in ( ) are the robust standard 
errors. 
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TABLE 11—REGRESSION: SALES COMPENSATION UPON A RECOMMENDATION FOR HYBRID BOND FUNDS II 
Variables Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 Marginal Effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
A-Class sales cost (%) 
(sales fee + front-end load) 
12.341*** 0.157* 12.372*** 15.532*** 0.283*** 
(4.271) (0.072) (4.289) (5.359) (0.062) 
C-Class sales fees  
(%) 
14.853*** 0.582*** 14.880*** 20.087*** 0.367*** 
(5.494) (0.104) (5.505) (7.341) (0.083) 
Fund size 
(log) 
2.639*** 0.458*** 2.659*** 2.680*** 0.489*** 
(0.796) (0.103) (0.796) (0.939) (0.009) 
Fund age 
(log, year) 
-0.883 0.052*** -0.870 1.068 0.194 
(1.697) (0.008) (1.721) (1.771) (0.032) 
Past 12-month market-
adjusted return (%) 
0.498 0.006 0.500 63.405*** 1.157*** 
(0.396) (0.030) (0.402) (22.16) (0.252) 
Volatility of  
past return (%) 
 1.235*** -0.040   
 (0.226) (0.295)   
Constant -30.616*** -25.773*** -30.310*** -496.944***  (7.666) (5.846) (7.776) (170.4)  
Monthly fixed effect x x x o  
No. of observations 415 415 415 415  
Log likelihood -48.90 -49.83 -48.89 -41.90  
Note: 1) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one billion won in March and 
April of 2015 were excluded. 2) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated using the KIS index, and 
they are the share class level net return after subtracting the sales compensation amount 3) ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, and the numbers in ( ) are the 
robust standard errors. 
 
and brokerage fees and adjusting the sample size. The regression results show all 
positive, significant coefficients for the sales fees for the A-Class and C-Class funds.  
The control variable, the fund size, shows significant and positive coefficients in 
all models (model (1), 2.795). This confirms that funds with larger AUM levels are 
more likely to be included on the recommendation list. The past 12-month market-
adjusted return shows a significant coefficient only in column (4).  
A-Class funds have two types of sales costs, while C-Class funds have only a sales 
fee. As the correlation table shows a significant correlation between a front-end load 
and a sales fee for A-Class funds, some studies use a variable which combines these 
sales costs instead of using two separate variables.   
Table 11 shows the regression results using the variable of the A-Class sales cost, 
a combination of the sales fee and the front-end load for the A-Class funds. The 
coefficients of the A-Class sales cost and the C-Class sales fee remain positive and 
significant. According to the average marginal effect of the model (4), the 
probabilities of being recommended are increased by 2.83%p and 3.67%p, 
respectively, if the size of the sales cost for both A-Class funds and C-Class funds is 
increased by 0.1%p. 
 
2. Domestic Equity Funds 
 
Table 12 reports the results the estimation of equation (1) with the sample of 
domestic equity funds. These results show positive and significant coefficients of 
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TABLE 12—REGRESSION: SALES COMPENSATION UPON A RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DOMESTIC EQUITY FUNDS I 
Variables Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 Marginal Effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
A-Class Front-end 
loads (%)  
9.442*** 9.269*** 9.279*** 10.81*** 0.188*** 
(2.840) (2.810) (3.014) (3.572) (0.050) 
A-Class sales fees 
(%) 
0.814 0.787 1.338 1.226 0.021 
(2.868) (2.857) (3.169) (3.643) (0.062) 
C-Class sales fees 
(%) 
6.339** 6.173** 6.245* 7.316* 0.127** 
(2.996) (2.966) (3.302) (3.855) (0.056) 
Fund size 
(log) 
3.730*** 3.685*** 3.868*** 4.308*** 0.745*** 
(0.834) (0.810) (0.944) (1.211) (0.006) 
Fund age 
(log, year) 
-3.947*** -3.847*** -4.250*** -4.671*** -0.081*** 
(1.287) (1.257) (1.440) (1.713) (0.020) 
Past 12-month market-
adjusted return (%) 
-0.770  1.510 3.166 0.055 
(0.728)  (1.045) (5.434) (0.093) 
Volatility of  
past return (%) 
  3.557*   
  (1.904)   
Constant -22.68*** -22.15*** -31.07*** -24.30***  (4.971) (4.773) (7.843) (6.964)  
Monthly fixed effect x x x o  
No. of observations 1,270 1,270 1,270 1,270  
Log likelihood -149.338 -149.663 -146.137 142.520  
Note: 1) Index funds are excluded. 2) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one 
billion won in March and April of 2015 were excluded. 3) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated 
using the KOSPI index, and the corresponding share class level net returns after subtracting sales compensation 
amounts. 4) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, 
and the numbers in ( ) are the robust standard errors. 
 
the front-end load for A-Class funds and the sales fee for C-Class funds, as expected. 
The coefficients of the sales fee for A-Class funds are not significant, but they are 
still positive. Thus, funds with high sales compensation amounts are also more likely 
to be recommended as a fund of the month among domestic equity funds. Table A2 
in the Appendix also verifies the positive effect of sales compensation on a 
recommendation even after management fees, brokerage fees, and adjusting for the 
sample size. 
Fund-scale factors in all models still show significant coefficients (model 1, 
3.730). Moreover, unlike the hybrid bond funds above, the coefficient of the fund 
age shows a significant and negative value (model 1, -3.947), indicating that fund-
selling companies tend to recommend relatively new funds. The coefficient of the 
12-month market-adjusted return is insignificant. 
In Table 13, even after accounting for the combined compensation of the front-
end loads and sales fees for A-Class funds, the coefficients are still positive and 
significant. Thus, we can confirm that the funds higher sales-related costs are also 
the more likely to be selected as a fund of the month from among domestic equity 
funds. According to the average marginal effect in model (4), the probability of being 
recommended is increased by 1.02%p if the sales cost of A-Class funds is increased 
by 0.1%p. 
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TABLE 13—REGRESSION: SALES COMPENSATION UPON A RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DOMESTIC EQUITY FUNDS II 
Variables Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 Marginal Effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
A-Class sales cost (%) 
(sales fee + front-end load) 
4.825** 4.715** 5.127* 5.832* 0.102** 
(2.359) (2.319) (2.650) (3.074) (0.045) 
C-Class sales fees 
(%) 
4.966 4.806 5.119 5.984 0.105 
(3.291) (3.255) (3.607) (4.195) (0.064) 
Fund size 
(log) 
3.659*** 3.606*** 3.828*** 4.258*** 0.075*** 
(0.850) (0.818) (0.986) (1.267) (0.007) 
Fund age 
(log, year) 
-4.109*** -3.997*** -4.441*** -4.884*** -0.085*** 
(1.324) (1.287) (1.505) (1.803) (0.021) 
Past 12-month market-
adjusted return (%) 
-0.754  1.584 3.424 0.060 
(0.729)  (1.054) (5.647) (0.098) 
Volatility of  
past return (%) 
  3.649*   
  (1.909)   
Constant -20.687*** 
-
20.132*** -29.671*** -22.310***  
(5.180) (4.952) (8.044) (7.285)  
Monthly fixed effect x x x o  
No. of observations 1,270 1,270 1,270 1,270  
Log likelihood -149.84 -150.16 -146.50 -142.96  
Note: 1) Index funds are excluded. 2) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one 
billion won in March and April of 2015 were excluded. 3) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated 
using the KOSPI index and the corresponding share class level net return after subtracting sales compensation 
amounts. 4) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, 
and the numbers in ( ) are the robust standard errors.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
  
This study examined whether fund sellers tend to recommend funds with higher 
sales-related costs in Korea. This assessment is meaningful as there are not many 
recent studies which focus on this issue. For the analysis, we utilized the 
recommendation lists posted on actual financial institutions’ webpages as a ‘fund of 
the month.’ This approach is useful as the size of net inflows to mutual funds could 
not be identified at the share class fund level. 
The averages of the sales fees and front-end loads of recommended funds and non-
recommended funds are compared. The comparison is conducted for A-Class and C-
Class funds among domestic equity funds and hybrid bond funds. The comparative 
analysis indicates that the recommended funds on the webpages have higher sales 
fees and front-end loads than the non-recommended funds. Moreover, past 
performance outcomes of recommended funds are not significantly superior to those 
of non-recommended funds at the class fund level after deducting sales-related costs.  
The regression analysis results confirm that funds with higher sales fees tend to 
be selected by fund sellers as a fund of the month, even after controlling for the 
effects of size and past performance. The results of the regression analysis show that 
fund-selling companies are making efforts to maximize their sales compensation 
when creating the list of recommended funds. 
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As sales fees or commissions are directly related to the profit of the fund-selling 
institutions, it is natural for these companies to make efforts to realize high sales 
compensation. Therefore, it is necessary to establish proper regulations pertaining to 
disclosures or other behavioral obligations to mitigate such conflicts of interest so 
that the rational economic behavior of fund sellers does not infringe upon their 
consumers’ interests. 
As this study examined only recommendation lists on webpages, there is a 
limitation when interpreting all recommendation services of actual fund sales 
channels with these results. For example, during the actual recommendation process, 
net inflows could be even higher in funds with greater sales fees. However, as this 
study could not utilize information about inflows, weighting according to inflow size 
was not utilized. 
Furthermore, because these recommended fund lists as posted on the webpages 
are open to the public, objectively excellent funds may have also appeared on the 
webpages. It is also possible that with face-to-face recommendations, fund sales 
personnel can be more sensitive to sales compensation levels in these cases as 
compared to publicly disclosed lists. Another limitation here is that the data 
collection period was short at five months. The future performances of recommended 
funds are also unaddressed in this study, and it is possible that consumers pay high 
sales costs to sellers, anticipating high future returns. These tasks all remain for 
future researchers. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON REGRESSION: HYBRID BOND FUNDS 
 Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A-Class front-end loads  1.335 3.049 5.521 5.710 (5.414) (2.898) (4.749) (4.975) 
A-Class sales fees 18.47*** 23.81*** 25.51*** 25.66*** (6.738) (8.074) (9.600) (9.706) 
C-Class sales fees 12.46* 16.08*** 17.88** 18.02** (6.943) (6.003) (7.519) (7.616) 
Fund size 8.437*** 3.221*** 2.840*** 2.913*** (3.007) (0.924) (0.837) (0.740) 
Fund size^2 -0.661**    (0.286)    
Fund age -1.845 -1.881 -1.704 -1.750 (1.402) (1.567) (1.617) (1.576) 
Past 12-month  
market-adjusted return 
0.507 0.512 0.507 -3.510 
(0.394) (0.425) (0.400) (15.91) 
Volatility of past return  -0.0601    (0.315)   
Management fee 2.579    (13.55)    
Brokerage fee  38.07*** 38.91***   (10.73) (11.47)   
Constant -41.32*** -34.41*** -32.25*** 15.68 (10.58) (10.01) (9.523) (208.0) 
Time fixed effect x x x o 
Sample adjustment x x o o 
No. of observations 415 415 585 585 
Log likelihood -39.290 -41.225 -47.190 -47.138 
Note: 1) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one billion won in March and April 
of 2015 were excluded. 2) In models 3 and 4, samples are adjusted by excluding funds with less than one billion won in 
June and July of 2015. 3) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated using the KOSPI index and the 
corresponding share class level net returns after subtracting sales compensation amounts. 4) ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, and the numbers in ( ) are the robust 
standard errors. 
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TABLE A2—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON REGRESSION: DOMESTIC EQUITY FUNDS 
 Dependent Variable: recommended=1, non-recommended=0 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A-Class front-end loads  9.955*** 10.02*** 9.305*** 11.89*** (3.412) (3.308) (3.302) (4.115) 
A-Class sales fees 0.483 1.280 0.743 1.388 (3.349) (3.406) (3.033) (3.829) 
C-Class sales fees 6.356* 6.563* 6.198* 7.966* (3.777) (3.588) (3.523) (4.356) 
Fund size 3.758*** 3.898*** 3.744*** 4.370*** (0.919) (1.045) (0.827) (1.462) 
Fund age -4.057*** -4.413*** -3.934*** -4.870** (1.460) (1.621) (1.284) (2.190) 
Past 12-month  
market-adjusted return 
-0.757 1.556 -0.773 3.725 
(0.755) (1.058) (0.728) (5.756) 
Volatility of past return  3.619*    (1.945)   
Management fee 0.958  0.426  (5.246)  (4.933)  
Brokerage fee  -2.379 -2.337  -3.622 (4.617) (3.492)  (10.39) 
Constant -22.81*** -31.07*** -22.85*** -24.19*** (5.827) (8.578) (5.257) (8.648) 
Time fixed effect x x x o 
Sample adjustment x x o x 
No. of observations 1,270 1,270 2,075 1,270 
Log likelihood -149.039 -145.793 -149.422 -142.169 
Note: 1) Index funds are excluded. 2) New funds less than one year of age and small-scale funds with less than one 
billion won in March and April of 2015 were excluded. 2) In models 3 and 4, samples are adjusted by excluding funds 
with less than one billion won in June and July of 2015. 3) Past 12-month market-adjusted returns are calculated using 
the KOSPI index and the corresponding share class level net returns after subtracting sales compensation amounts. 4) 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively, and the numbers 
in ( ) are the robust standard errors. 
  
TABLE A3—WILCOXON RANK-SUM TEST: MEDIAN SALES FEE AND FRONT-END LOAD (A CLASS) 
(Unit: %) 
Fund types 
Median sales fee Median front-end load 
Recommended Non- Recommended Z-stat Recommended 
Non- 
Recommended Z-stat 
Domestic equity 0.75 0.7095 1.667* 1 1 1.466 
Hybrid bond 0.5 0.5 0.154 0.7 0.5 0.913 
Note: 1) The numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) are (32, 154) for domestic equity funds 
and (7, 18) for hybrid bond funds. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 3) Index funds are excluded from domestic equity funds. 
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TABLE A4—WILCOXON RANK-SUM TEST: MEDIAN SALES FEE (C CLASS) 
(Unit: %) 
Fund types 
Median sales fee 
Recommended Non-recommended Z-stat 
Domestic equity fund 0.95 1 -0.306 
Hybrid bond fund 0.9 0.8 2.232** 
Note: 1) The numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) are (9, 77) for domestic equity funds and 
(7, 58) for hybrid bond funds. 2) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. 3) Index funds are excluded from domestic equity funds. 
 
TABLE A5—WILCOXON RANK-SUM TEST: MEDIAN PAST FUND PERFORMANCE (SHARE CLASS LEVEL) 
Fund type Share Class 
12-month market-adjusted return 18-month abnormal return  
Recommended Non- recommended Z-stat Recommended 
Non- 
recommended Z-stat 
Domestic 
equity 
A  -0.0082 -0.0083 0.433 -0.0246 -0.0252 0.626 
C  -0.0079 -0.0081 0.43 -0.0245 -0.0247 0.412 
Hybrid 
bond  
A  0.0853 0.0847 3.268*** -0.0612 -0.0469 -1.353 
C  0.0852 0.0848 1.735* -0.0532 -0.0443 -0.702 
Note: 1) For the 12-month market-adjusted returns, the numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) 
are A (32, 154) and C (9, 78) for domestic equity funds and A (7, 18) and C (7, 59) for hybrid bond funds. 2) For 18-
month abnormal returns, the numbers of observations of (recommended, non-recommended) are A (30, 151) and C (8, 
70) for domestic equity funds and A (5, 15) and C (6, 49) for hybrid bond funds. 3) Past returns are calculated at the 
point of May 4th, 2015. Abnormal returns are estimated by alpha from the three-factor model of Fama and French 
(1993). For the market factor, the KOSPI index is used for equity funds and the KIS index is used for hybrid bond funds. 
4) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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